This article examines the Shiite theology of the Twelver Shi›ism from the Ilkhani period in the seventh century to the end of the Safavid period in the twelfth century. In the first part, the role of Naṣir al-Din al-Țūsi is discussed, who, by introducing Ibn Sinā›s philosophical concepts into theological discussions, transformed the Shiite theology of the Twelver Shi›ism, a change that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazāli and Fakhruddin Rāzi brought about among the Ash›arites. After Țūsi, attention has been paid to Imami theologians. ‘Allāma ḤillĪ and his son Fakhr al-Muhaqiqin and Bahraini scholars including Ibn Sa’ādah Baḥrāni, Meysam Baḥrāni, Ali Ibn Sulaymān Baḥrāni and finally Ibn Abi Jumhūr Aḥsāi are among the theologians whose works and Ideas have been studied. The second part pf this article deals with the Safavid period. The combination of theology and philosophy in the works of some theologians of this period, the role of hadith sources in theological orientations, the conversion of some scholars of this period to the earlier Imami theology and the efforts of the opponents of theology to establish themselves as official representatives of the Twelver Shiites are among the issues discussed in this chapter.

The issue of moral luck is one of the interesting and influential issues in contemporary philosophy of ethics. The main question of this discussion can be expressed as follows: Do matters that are beyond the authority and control of the moral agent affect his moral standing or the extent of his worthiness for moral praise or blame? The “Principle of Control” replies negatively to this question while “Moral Luck” gives a positive one. In the first encounter with the jurisprudential tradition after Shaykh Ansari, it seems that there are two stances in this regard. Through the analytic study of this jurisprudential tradition, the authors have strived to identify, review, and explain the views presented in this intellectual tradition. The emphasis of the jurists that an involuntary act is outside the scope of duty, at least apparently, is an emphasis of the Principle of Control,however, we will see that this principle derived from the principles of jurisprudence is different from the Principle of Control raised in contemporary philosophy of ethics. On the other hand, the views of some jurists in the discussion of tajarrī, and their jurisprudence and interpretation regarding some narrations supports the acceptance of moral luck. A comparison of the collection of prevalent views in the principles of jurisprudence of contemporary Twelver Shiites leads us to the conclusion that the stance of most of them is to accept moral luck along with a particular reading that is compatible with the Principle of Control.   Introduction The issue of moral luck that was raised at the end of the twentieth century by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams can also be pursued in Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence. The aims of the authors of this paper are to identify, review, and analyze the prevalent view or viewsamong contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists in dealing with the issue of moral luck. In the jurisprudential tradition after Shaykh Ansari, there is a stance that approves the Principle of Control. However, a point to note is that the jurists have a particular reading of this principle which is different from the prevalent reading in contemporary philosophy of ethics. Some of the stances of contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists also support the acceptance of moral luck. As a result, moral luck is situational and dispositional. In this paper, we will show that many of the contemporary jurists accept moral luck and the Principle of Control that is compatible with it. The principle of control in Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence Based on the existing literature in contemporary philosophy of ethics, the Principle of Control can be explained as follows: The Principle of Control 1: The moral agent can only be morally evaluated to the extent that moral evaluation is based on factors that are under his free will and control. In contemporary Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence, free will is considered a necessary condition for duties or moral judgments. It seems that this view approves of the Principle of Control,however, not precisely the Principle of Control 1. The principle that can be attributed to the jurists is as follows: The Principle of Control 2: The moral agent is only assessable for the performance of an action that is under his authority and control. Or if it is not under his authority and control, the agent himself has caused this lack of authority through a voluntary act. Moral luck in Twelver Shiite principles of jusrisprudence On the other hand, some jurists do not consider a person who is a mutajarrī (one who has performed an act that he thinks is a sin which is not actually a sin) to be deserving of punishment,in contrast to a sinner whereas the difference between the two is in something that is beyond their authority and control. Similarly, it is well-known among jurists that a marja[1] who has arrived at reality will receive twice the reward while one had not arrived would receive one, whereas reaching reality is not completely under his authority and control. Two marajiʿ may strive to the same extent,however, only one of them will arrive at the correct view. The third stance that some contemporary jurists have raised regarding the worthiness of reward or punishment due to an involuntary action is their interpretation of narrations that state: The reward of someone who establishes a good tradition increases to the extent of adherence to that tradition and the punishment of someone who establishes a bad tradition increases to the extent of adherence to that tradition. Obviously, the extent of adherence to a tradition is not completely under the control of the founder of that tradition and two founders may strive to exactly the same extent to promote their traditions,however, one tradition will have more followers. Discussion The view of this group of jurists in these discussions requires that something outside the control and authority of the agent influences his worthiness of reward or punishment and this is equivalent to the acceptance of moral luck. Considering the differences between the Principle of Control 1 and 2, it seems that the Principle of Control 2 can be combined with moral luck and, as a result, with situational and dispositional moral luck. Based on the Principle of Control 2, for an agent to be properly evaluated, it is sufficient that his action is performed voluntarily, or if it is involuntary, the agent himself caused this involuntariness. However, based on the Principle of Control 1, the agent is only assessable to the extent that moral evaluation is based on factors that are under his authority and control. In reality, in the Principle of Control 2, only the voluntariness of an action is important and if the action itself is voluntary, the moral evaluation of the agent is not limited to the extent that the action is voluntary and under one’s control. Conclusion Some contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists believe that sometimes a matter beyond the authority and control of an agent is influential in the extent of the worthiness of praise and reward, or blame and punishment of an agent and, therefore, they accept moral luck,except causal luck. Similarly, the jurists also believe in a specific reading of the principle that is compatible with it.

Good faith means doing duties honestly, fairly and logically, duties which two parties of the contract or other contract related third parties expect them from one another. Meta jurisprudential conceptions such as sincerity, justice, fairness and some jurisprudential rules such as irrevocability of contracts, prohibition of causing loss and damage, benefaction and principle of validity are the origins of the principle of good faith in Islamic resources. Therefore, the divine legislator presumes the principle of validity and considering Muslims behavior as valid, a point mentioned and emphasized in the Quran. This rule sometimes functions negatively to express the instances of good faith such as forbidding people from deceiving others. So, with regard to the point that Imamiyyah jurisprudence is the original resource of Iranian law, the legislator can, by inspiring from moral and jurisprudential teachings, legislate the principle of good faith. In this article, some of approaches to good faith in sale contract and contract of mandate will be briefly studied.

Necessity of formulating a jurisprudence which could be simply actualized (religious permissions) is the contemporary juristic discourse. Since Islamic Shariʻa has been based from the very beginning on ease and repelling hardship on the one hand and complexity of modern life necessitates reduction in the position of action on the other, we should seek permissions with regard to the conditions caused by necessities and needs of the modern life. In fact, the mechanism of acting on the basis of facilitating Islamic jurisprudence is among necessary approaches of observing general expediencies which are caused by temporal and special necessities of human life – of course, conditional upon such facilitating not being in contradiction to Islamic principles and essentials. Defining religious permissions and referring to some of their instances first, the present research deals, then, with searching opinions of the Twelver Shiite jurists in order to find all instances of religious permissions in the jurisprudence so that it may present the theory of religious permissions as a base of legitimacy of lawmaking and a specific, practical method of lawmaking.

The concept of the ideal human being is an important concept in all religions, especially, in Mahayana Buddhism and Twelver Shi'ism. The Mahayana ideal human is “, Bodhisattva”,who begins his path of enlightenment with the awakening of “, Bodhicitta”,and steps on the path of spiritual journey with a covenant and oath for liberating himself as well as all intelligent beings. After passing mystical states or Bhumis, he removes the veils and obstacles and, in each state, acquires the perfection (Paramita) corresponding to that state. In the last state, Bodhisattva can join the ultimate liberation, “, Nirvana”, , however due to his infinite kindness and compassion, “, Karuna”, , refuses to enter it and remains in the circle of reincarnation, “, Samsara”, , to help other beings. The most perfect examples of the ideal human being in Shi’, ism are the Prophet and the infallible Imams, who have a special and great position in Shi’, ism. According to the Shi’, ite tradition, the Imams are the mirrors of the truth, the mediators of heaven, the Caliphs of Allah on earth and adorned with all human virtues. They can lead human beings to true perfection and divine knowledge. Despite the differences of Buddhist and Shi’, ite traditions, beliefs in Bodhisattva and Imam have significant similarities in features and functions that make their comparison meaningful. Infallibility, infinite knowledge, miraculous powers, developmental and canonical role in guidance, and being the sources for the appeals of the people are among these similarities.

In both Shiite and Protestant denominations, faith is the most important factor of salvation, so the question of current research is: may one argue that human action be as important as faith for salvation? And is the importance of action in determining the level and perfection of faith or in achieving salvation? In the Shiism, this issue was first raised during the formation of the Kharijite sect. This issue then continued among the Murji‘, ah, the Mu’, tazilites and the Shiites. This research examines the place of action in salvation from the perspective of Shiites and Protestants through a comparative research method. The findings show that salvation in the Protestant first and foremost means liberation from original sin and then liberation from hell, but in the Shiism, according to the original teaching of purity, salvation only means liberation from hell. But in both, action is an instrument of faith and its perfection, but to achieve salvation, it is not reassuring and can not be relied on.

The Khuja Twelver Shiites are a small cohesive minority who enjoys a considerable order and discipline in spite of their small population of 125000. This small minority is present in five continents of the world and, besides, is under the supervision of Global Federation of Khuja Twelver Shiites. In addition, they enjoy an independent community in any country.In the present article, we have used an analytical-descriptive method to investigate the way this small religious minority has emerged as an active agent. The main hypothesis of the article is the fact that this small Shiite community has experienced many successes from the onset. The framework of the research rests on the fact that Khuja Twelver Shiites can serve as a role model for other Shiite communities in many affairs. Dealing with all the primary and secondary factors involving in the success of this small Shiite community in various countries is the initiative aspect of this article.

Imam Hasan Askari (A.S.) became the Imam during a period when the political oppression of the Abbasid rulers was so intense that he and his honorable father had to reside in the military camp of the city of Askar. Furthermore, the Abbasid rulers' excessive attention to his household in search of his son led Imam Askari to keep his son’s birth a secret. As a result, after his martyrdom and the ensuing difficulties, including the occultation of Imam Mahdi (A.S.), the Shia faced significant divisions at the onset of the Minor Occultation. However, it was important to note that Imam Askari (A.S.) knew very well that protecting his son would ensure the continuation of the Imamate and that the next Imam could reunite the fragmented community. This is exactly what occurred at the end of the Minor Occultation. Therefore, this research, through a library-based and descriptive-analytical method, seeks to answer the question of how Imam Askari, by concealing his son’s birth, managed to preserve both the Imamate of Imam Mahdi (A.S.) and the unity of the Shia during the transitional period. The study aims to demonstrate that the Shia, through the concept of Imamate and under the leadership of Imam Mahdi (A.S.), achieved cohesion. Key actions by Imam Askari included not having a formal marriage, concealing the birth of Imam Mahdi, and circulating news of the deaths of some of his other children. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the representative system and the issuance of numerous letters (Tawqi'at) during the Minor Occultation were among Imam Mahdi’s (A.S.) efforts to ensure the cohesion of the Shia community.

The present article examines the role of Madrasah (school) in the Shia Safavid Iran has expanded on that show how the Madrasah could affect the development of Twelver Shiite in Iran. The trend was to build Madrasah in the Safavid era was supported by the Safavid government. In endowment’s madrasahes, especially madrasahes that were more than endowments and financial institutions to hold the attention of Shiite religious rites. Madrasah as much as possible during this period was the Shiite religion and education. Survivors through their Madrasah education plays an important role in promoting the Shiite in society. Training in madrasah, specialy Madrasahes of grate cities, influenced in developing of Shiite on formal and unformal posts.

Before Khā, ja –,when theology had not become philosophical in its true sense –,theologians attained the solution to the problem of evil from the qur’, ā, nic verses and narrations of Ahl al-Bayt (a). As a result, their solutions were different from the theological theories on evils. The Twelver Shī, ‘, a theologians deemed the evil to emanate from God but did not take this as contradictory to the absolute benevolence of God –,which was taken from the Christian theology. In the Twelver Shī, ‘, a theology, God is Wise, and the existence of evils is not unnecessary and is because of the divine wisdom. Therefore, the evils and afflictions of the material world are good, because God compensates evil with the two principles of “, Intiṣ, ā, f”,and “, ‘, Iwaḍ, . ”,